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Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity1 
Carl Knight, University of Glasgow 
 
Introduction 
Discrimination, understood as differential treatment of individuals on the basis of their 
respective group memberships, is widely considered to be morally wrong.2 This moral judgment 
is backed in many jurisdictions with the passage of equality of opportunity legislation, which aims 
to ensure that racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, sexual-orientation, disability and other groups are 
not subjected to discrimination. This chapter explores the conceptual underpinnings of 
discrimination and equality of opportunity using the tools of analytical moral and political 
philosophy. 
 
Discrimination 
Though discrimination is widely considered to be morally wrong, there are in fact forms of 
conduct that would meet the ‘differential treatment of individuals on the basis of their respective 
group memberships’ criterion, but not be considered wrong. The clearest case would be so-called 
‘affirmative action’, which offers more favourable treatment for members of (historically) 
disadvantaged groups, and which is often referred to as ‘reverse’, ‘positive’, or ‘compensatory’ 
discrimination (Nagel 1973; Dworkin 1977: ch. 9). Whatever one’s attitude to particular real 
world cases of affirmative action, one is likely to accept that some possible cases of affirmative 
action would not be morally wrong: for instance, a policy that lowered a racial minority’s 
university admission requirements by x% where high school examiners are known with certainty 
to systematically discriminate in their marking against members of this group by x%. This shows 
that discrimination is not, of itself, wrongful, and that identifying something as a case of 
discrimination does not, by itself, tell us whether to be positively or negatively disposed towards 
it. 
 The important question, then, is what makes discrimination wrongful (where it’s wrongful)? 
Several answers to this question have been advanced. 
A first account says that discrimination is wrongful where it shows disrespect towards the 
discriminatee. This account typically focuses on the objective meaning of the discriminatory act – a 
meaning that demeans or shows contempt for the discriminatee (Lippert-Rasmussen 2013, ch. 
5). For instance, Deborah Hellman (2008: 6, 8) writes that ‘to demean is to treat another in a way 
that denies her equal moral worth’, which is contrary to the ‘bedrock moral principle’ of the 
‘equal moral worth of all persons’. The disrespect account, in its various guises, is widely held in 
the literature (Cavanagh 2002; Hellman 2008; Scanlon 2008; Glasgow 2009; Clayton 2012). 
A second account holds that discrimination is wrongful where it is based on prejudice 
towards the discriminatee. This account typically focuses on the objectionable mental state of the 
discriminator (Lippert-Rasmussen 2013: ch. 4). For example, Peter Vallentyne (2006: 982-983) 
says that ‘invidious discrimination’ involves ‘the treatment of an individual less favourably 
because of some feature one believes the individual to possess, where (1) the person is not 
morally or prudentially responsible for having the feature in question; and (2) the treatment is 
based on (a) a mistaken belief in the moral inferiority of those having the feature, (b) a 
significantly mistaken empirical belief about people having the feature, or (c) hatred of those 
having the feature’. Other versions of the prejudice account identify wrongful discrimination 
with biases based on mistaken moral judgments, or flaws in how beliefs about the discriminatee 
were formed (Alexander 1992; Arneson 2006). 
                                                          
1 In Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination (Routledge, 2017). Earlier 
versions of this chapter were presented at Keele University in November 2016 and the University of Glasgow in 
December 2016. I thank the audiences on those occasions, and especially Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen and an 
anonymous reviewer for their written comments. 
2 Discrimination in this sense is ‘group discrimination’. For discussion see Lippert-Rasmussen 2013: ch. 1. 
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 A third account maintains that discrimination is wrongful where it harms the 
discriminatee. This account typically focuses on the loss of advantage (e.g. welfare, resources, or 
capabilities) suffered by the discriminatee. However, it clearly cannot be the case that any 
discrimination that reduces an agent’s advantage level is wrongful. Among other things, that 
would imply that all forms of affirmative action are wrongful, no matter how well they furthered 
justice and other moral goals. Thus, harm accounts must specify further conditions for 
reductions in advantage levels to amount to (wrongful) harm. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2013) 
suggests a ‘desert prioritarian’ view according to which acts are morally right if and only if they 
maximize moral value, which depends on (1) the amount of well-being thereby realized, (2) how 
badly off well-being recipients are, and (3) the desert levels of well-being recipients (see also 
Arneson 1999a, 1999b). On this view, discrimination is wrongful where it does not maximize 
moral value, and ‘a given amount of well-being has greater moral value when it accrues to a badly 
off, deserving person than it does when it accrues to a well-off, undeserving person’ (Lippert-
Rasmussen 2013: 166). (Equality of opportunity views can be construed as a different kind of 
harm view – specifically, as a view about comparative harm. As I will treat these views at length in 
the next section, I will here focus on Lippert-Rasmussen’s non-comparative version of the harm 
account.) 
Finally, there are hybrid views, which include elements of more than one of the above 
accounts. For instance, Thomas Scanlon (2008: 73) seems to endorse a view according to which 
discrimination is wrongful on the grounds of both its disrespectful and harmful character, while 
Alexander’s (1992) account of wrongful discrimination, while foregrounding prejudice, seems 
also to contain elements of the respect account. 
 In considering actual cases of wrongful discrimination, it is likely that disrespect, 
prejudice, and harm are all present. For instance, a sexist employer that refuses to promote 
female employees is, under usual circumstances, certainly disrespecting and harming them, and 
almost certainly on the basis of prejudice. This helps to explain the appeal of the disrespect 
account, prejudice account, and harm account: each captures a prominent feature of actual cases 
of wrongful discrimination. But it also means that, in order to find which of the features of 
disrespect, prejudice, and harm are actually responsible for the wrongfulness, we must consider 
unusual cases of apparently unjust discrimination in which one or more of these features is 
absent.  
There is a kind of case that seems to defeat the disrespect view, by identifying cases of 
wrongful discrimination that would not be identified as such by the view. Lippert-Rasmussen 
(2013: 146-147) describes two such cases: 
 
it seems that not all kinds of intentional discriminatory acts involve a judgment of 
inferiority, e.g., a patriarch who avoids hiring a certain applicant simply because she is a 
woman and thereby intends to avoid hiring women, not because he thinks, as most 
patriarchs do, women are inferior, but because he thinks that there is a clear division of 
labor between the sexes and women’s place is in the home. A further complication 
derives from the fact that an employer may refrain from “giving a person a certain 
benefit,” i.e., hiring him, because he thinks that the job is inferior and that it ought only 
to be performed by inferior persons. Should one say here that it is permissible not to hire 
the applicant—say, a Brahmin—considered superior by the employer, but not 
permissible not to hire the Brahmin with the intention to avoid hiring a superior person 
for an inferior job—say, a job the employer deems suitable only for Dalits? 
 
The first example is trickier, perhaps because a liberal will interpret the idea that ‘there is 
a clear division of labor between the sexes and women’s place is in the home’ as a façade 
intended to disguise the true intention of subjugating women. But in the second case it seems 
clear that there is no disrespect to the discriminatee conveyed by the discriminator - the 
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discriminator’s reason for denying the applicant the job is precisely the high status the 
discriminator assigns to the discriminatee. Furthermore, we can extend the case so that this 
seems to be clearly wrongful. Suppose, for instance, that there are many Brahmins left 
unemployed by hiring decisions of this sort, and that this is not even of benefit to other groups, 
who are not interested in these jobs. 
 Such cases are also problematic for some versions of the prejudice view. An employer 
that refuses to hire Brahmins because she believes they are too good for the job is not acting out 
of hatred to Brahmins. Nor is she acting on an opinion that Brahmins are inferior - quite the 
contrary! It might be said, however, that she is acting on a faulty, or faultily formed, belief about 
Brahmins. Epistemic versions of the prejudice view therefore do not seem to be undermined by 
this case. 
A different kind of case does challenge these views, however. Suppose Alexandra treats 
Barbara worse than Christina, because she falsely believes that Christina is more deserving than 
Barbara. This is, on the face of it, less wrongful than a second case in which Diana treats Barbara 
unjustifiably worse than Christina where she does not falsely believe that Christina is more 
deserving than Barbara (Lippert-Rasmussen 2013: 120). In the first case, it intuitively seems that 
Alexandra has at least something of an excuse for treating Barbara less favourably, namely, that 
she believes Barbara to be less deserving. The prejudice view says that holding that false belief 
makes the discrimination wrongful; but in fact it seems, if anything, to reduce the amount of 
wrongfulness. In the second case, there is no false belief, and the prejudice view under 
consideration takes that fact as implying that there is no wrongful discrimination. But in fact, the 
absence of a false belief that might explain why Diana treats Barbara unfavourably does not seem 
to remove any wrongfulness from her behaviour (it may well make it worse). There are similar 
difficulties with epistemic versions of the prejudice view that say that wrongful discrimination is 
based on faultily formed beliefs. If Alexandra’s views about Barbara’s and Christina’s desert levels 
were faultily formed, while Diana’s were not, that hardly seems to justify the conclusion that 
Alexandra’s harsh treatment of Barbara is wrongful but Diana’s similarly harsh treatment of 
Barbara was not. If anything, Diana’s epistemic advantage removes a possible excuse for her 
behaviour, making it more blameworthy. Thus, it seems that there will be cases of wrongful 
discrimination in which none of the conditions for prejudice are satisfied. Just as wrongful 
discrimination is possible without disrespect, so too is it possible without prejudice. If we want 
an account of what it is that makes discrimination wrongful, we must look elsewhere. 
 This naturally takes us to the harm account. We should notice right away that this 
account, as set out by Lippert-Rasmussen, has little difficulty with the kind of case that sunk the 
disrespect and prejudice accounts. The employer that would not hire Brahmins would, typically, 
create disadvantages for Brahmins that are discriminated against. In some cases, such as that 
described above where the jobs are not taken by others, there would be no (or insufficient) 
offsetting advantages for other groups, in which case the discrimination is condemned by desert-
accommodating prioritarianism. In others, there are sufficient advantages for other groups to 
offset the discrimination (e.g. they take the jobs), in which case the discrimination is not 
condemned by desert-accommodating prioritarianism and is instead considered a case of 
affirmative action. This seems like a plausible way of responding to the case.  
 There is, however, a further case that proves more problematic for desert-
accommodating prioritarianism as an account of wrongful discrimination. Suppose that two 
applicants for a job are identical in all respects except one: their religious affiliation. Their 
expected job performance is identical. The employer discriminates against one of the applicants 
on religious grounds, and appoints the other applicant. Desert prioritarianism has no complaint 
with this outcome. The two applicants are, ex hypothesi, identical in well-being and desert levels, 
so assuming that there is only one job to be allocated and it cannot be divided, it makes no 
difference who the recipient is, nor – and here’s the kicker – on what grounds the allocation is 
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made. This seems to be a case where wrongful discrimination is overlooked by desert-
accommodating prioritarianism. 
 Responding to a case that is in some respects similar to this, Lippert-Rasmussen (2013: 
173) comments that 
 
Friends of desert prioritarianism can concede that something may well be morally amiss 
in cases involving beneficial discriminatory acts, but insist that what is morally amiss is 
not that the act is wrong. To deny that a certain discriminatory act that maximizes moral 
value is bad is not to imply that the agent cannot be criticized for performing it; the agent 
might, for example, have had reason to believe that the act would on balance harm the 
discriminatee, and thus attract blame for performing the act. 
 
He adds that one may criticize the moral character of an agent, even where their action is morally 
right (see Lippert-Rasmussen 2013: 123-124, 160, 173). I agree that in many cases, an agent acts 
correctly, but for reasons that reflect badly on their character, perhaps leaving them open to 
blame. But I do not see that this could be a desert prioritarian’s description of a case in which an 
employer deliberately satisfies desert prioritarianism, and with this done acts in a gratuitously 
discriminatory way. Such an agent is not even slightly criticisable from a desert prioritarian 
perspective. Moreover, we can criticize not just the agent’s reasoning, but action. Our intuitive 
response to the case is not that the employer acts correctly, for the wrong reason, as where a 
would-be wrongdoer inadvertently does right. It is that the employer acts wrongfully, for the 
wrong reason. She should not have discriminated against the applicant on religious grounds, just 
as she should not have been motived by irrelevant religious reasons. I therefore conclude that, in 
spite of its strengths, the desert prioritarian harm account fails to identify some cases of wrongful 
discrimination. 
 
Equality of opportunity 
It is time to consider an alternative approach to discrimination – equality of opportunity. In this 
section I survey the three main accounts of equality of opportunity found in the normative 
political theory literature. It should be emphasized that these have not been developed primarily 
as accounts of wrongful discrimination, but rather as principles of justice. Nevertheless, on the 
assumption that a discriminatory act that breaches a principle of equality of opportunity amounts 
to wrongful discrimination, each principle yields a distinctive view of wrongful discrimination. I 
will argue that none of these three principles, by itself, offers a fruitful account of wrongful 
discrimination. In the next section I suggest that one of them can be combined with desert 
prioritarianism to make such an account. 
 A key section of John Rawls’ famous A Theory of Justice considers two possible 
interpretations of the principle that ‘social and economic equalities are to be arranged so that 
they are … attached to positions and offices open to all’ (Rawls 1999: 53). The first of these he 
refers to as ‘careers open to talents’. This specifies ‘a formal equality of opportunity in that all 
have at least the same legal rights of access to all advantaged social positions’ (Rawls 1999: 62). 
Formal equality of opportunity requires that positions are allocated on the basis of a ‘fair 
contest’, in which ‘one should be judged only on those characteristics relevant to one’s future 
performance in the position for which one is applying’ (Fishkin 2014: 25). This position rules out 
not just de jure but also de facto discrimination, such as racist or sexist hiring decisions.3 
                                                          
3 Here I follow conventional interpretation of Rawls – see, for instance, Freeman 2007, 88-90; Mandle 2009, 27-28. 
It is worth noting, however, that Rawls’ definition quoted in the text does not explicitly say that formal equality of 
opportunity rules out de facto discrimination or requires a ‘fair contest’. Everyone having ‘at least the same legal 
rights of access to all advantaged social positions’ could just mean that there are no legal restrictions on who can 
apply for which jobs, but that employers can review applications according to whichever criteria they choose. This 
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 Rawls (1999: 63) himself rejects formal equality of opportunity, noting that it ‘permits 
distributive shares to be improperly influenced by … factors so arbitrary from a moral point of 
view’. For instance, according to formal equality of opportunity, a person that attended a private 
school that offers a high standard of education, and whose talents are therefore developed more 
effectively than equivalent state-educated people, will legitimately have a competitive advantage 
when it comes to applying for university places or jobs. Concerned to address such arbitrary 
factors, Rawls instead favours the second interpretation of ‘attached to positions and office open 
to all’, which he refers to as ‘fair equality of opportunity’: 
 
The thought here is that positions are to be open not merely in the formal sense, but that 
all should have a fair chance to attain them. Offhand it is not clear what is meant, but we 
might say that those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances. More 
specifically, assuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are at the 
same level of ability and talent, and have the same willingness to use them, should have 
the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system (Rawls 
1999: 63). 
 
Fair equality of opportunity is clearly a far more demanding principle than formal 
equality of opportunity. It requires not just that a contest is ‘fair’ at the moment of decision, but 
that certain background conditions are in place to ensure that people have a fair chance to 
develop their natural talents. As Rawls (1999: 63) notes, this requires that the ‘school system, 
whether public or private, should be designed to even out class barriers’. It also justifies an 
inheritance tax in order to prevent inequalities growing so large that equal education is 
threatened (Rawls 1999: 245-246). In terms of discrimination specifically, fair equality of 
opportunity would seem to justify radical policies of affirmative action. As it requires those with 
similar natural abilities to have similar life prospects, it would appear to require that, where an 
individual’s natural abilities have not been cultivated as well as others’ (for instance, due to 
substandard state schools), they should be admitted to jobs and universities with lesser 
qualifications than persons who did not have this developmental disadvantage (see Arneson 
1999b: 81). To see the radical implications here, note that the rationale for the affirmative action 
is not that the qualifications are thought to have failed to accurately estimate future 
performance.4 Rather, the applicants are thought likely to underperform compared to non-
disadvantaged people with better qualifications, but are admitted anyway in order to provide 
them with similar prospects to these people. A failure to provide affirmative action of this sort 
would amount to wrongful discrimination against those with a disadvantageous background. 
 Fair equality of opportunity faces some serious problems. Arneson draws attention to the 
fact that fair equality of opportunity only requires that people who are similarly talented and 
motivated have similar prospects. This implies that there is no injustice if men assume all positions 
of advantage in a society that socializes its women to believe that seeking positions of advantage 
is unladylike (Arneson 1999b: 78). In such a society, fair equality of opportunity simply considers 
men and women to have differential ‘willingness’ to use their natural talents, so differential 
outcomes are justified. A further objection is noted by Rawls himself. While fair equality of 
opportunity aims to neutralize the effects of social circumstance on people’s life chances, it does 
not aim to neutralize the effects of natural circumstance, such as native talent. As Rawls (1999: 
64) observes, ‘[t]here is no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be 
settled by the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social fortune’. 
 Rawls’ response to this latter difficulty is to complement fair equality of opportunity with 
the difference principle, which ensures that inequality is to the benefit of the worse off and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
shows that the ‘fair contest’ version of formal equality of opportunity is far from trivial; it rules out much actual 
discrimination that weaker versions of equality of opportunity would not. 
4 Joseph Fishkin (2014: 33-34) mentions a ‘formal-plus’ equality of opportunity that would take this kind of strategy. 
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thereby mitigates the impact of lower natural talents. Some writers question whether it really 
achieves this objective (Kymlicka 2002: 70-74). In any case, the difference principle is of little 
interest for our purposes as it clearly cannot provide a more successful account of equality of 
opportunity. 
 A more promising response to the concerns about natural abilities is to develop a form 
of equality of opportunity that is even more radical than fair equality of opportunity. This third 
and final account of equality of opportunity is luck egalitarianism (Arneson 1989). As the name 
suggests, it aims to equalize (or neutralize) the effects of luck on distributions. In a famous 
formulation, luck egalitarianism is overtly presented as an account of equality of opportunity – 
specifically, as ‘equality of opportunity for welfare’ (Arneson 1989; see also Cohen 1989).  
Shlomi Segall has recently presented an appealing luck egalitarian account of the badness 
of discrimination. According to Segall, ‘[d]iscrimination … is bad when, and only when, it upsets’ 
equality of opportunity for welfare (Segall 2013: 109). To see the appeal of this kind of view, 
note that an individual’s natural talents are, just like her social circumstances, a matter of luck for 
her. Luck egalitarianism therefore aims to prevent natural talents from influencing distributions. 
This allows it to sidestep the objection to fair equality of opportunity that it arbitrarily 
distinguishes between social and natural contingencies. Affirmative action for those with social 
disadvantages and those with natural disadvantages would be justified. Luck egalitarianism would 
also not be satisfied, as fair equality of opportunity is, with a situation in which women are 
socialized to accept less advantaged positions: such a situation clearly disadvantages them as a 
matter of luck. 
 In spite of its attractions, luck egalitarianism faces significant difficulties. A variant of a 
familiar objection points out that luck egalitarianism, as a form of egalitarianism, will favour 
levelling down (Parfit 2000). Luck egalitarianism aims to reduce inequality of opportunity for 
welfare, and one way of doing that is to reduce the opportunities for welfare of the better off. Consider a 
case of discrimination with this feature. A council planning officer in a Western country is 
considering an application to build a Hindu temple. The town could easily accommodate the 
temple, and this would have beneficial welfare effects for local Hindus. However, it happens that 
the Hindus have greater opportunities for welfare than do other groups. If the planning officer 
denies planning permission for the temple, squandering the possibility of a welfare gain for local 
Hindus, luck egalitarianism will have no complaint with this decision. Nor, if we add that the 
planning officer’s decision was a discriminatory one, will a luck egalitarian account of 
discrimination identify any badness with that discrimination, since it reduced inequality of 
opportunity for welfare. 
 Segall anticipates concerns about levelling down. He replies, firstly, that an unequal 
distribution makes the worst off ‘potentially envious’ of the better off, and secondly, that the 
inequality ‘calls for a justification, whether or not there is a preferable alternative to it’ (Segall 
2013: 31). I am not quite sure what the relevance of the possible envy is intended to be, but in 
any case, it is easy to construct a case in which there is inequality but no envy – indeed, there is 
no reason to suppose that the non-Hindus in the above example are in any way envious. This 
leaves the fact that the inequality ‘calls for a justification’, but there seems absolutely no difficulty 
in providing such a justification. It could, for instance, be said that the inequality is justified 
because it benefits some members of the community and does no one any harm. Contra Segall 
(2013: 26-27), surely the defender of levelling down owes at least as much of a justification – his 
suggested defence for equality of ‘why the hell not!’ seems positively offensive in a case where 
people are being forced to forego significant improvements to their lives, for the sake of a 
distribution that benefits no one at all. Of course, there is much more that could be said about 
levelling down,5 but I doubt that it is compatible with a plausible account of the badness of 
discrimination.6 
                                                          
5 Segall (2013: 138) gestures towards the different defence that levelling down is a problem for rules of regulation, 
rather than justice. But many would deny that levelling down is compatible with justice – it is plausible not just that 
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Discrimination and equality of opportunity 
We have so far surveyed several accounts of wrongful discrimination and several accounts of 
equality of opportunity, but have found none of them truly satisfactory. In this section I argue 
that the desert prioritarian account of wrongful discrimination can be combined with an account 
of equality of opportunity to yield a successful overall account of wrongful discrimination. 
 To see the motivation for this combination, we should return to the case that seemed to 
defeat desert prioritarianism, in which a job application was rejected on religious grounds but in 
such a way that desert-prioritarian moral value was maximized. The discussion of equality of 
opportunity provides several different ways of branding this a case of wrongful discrimination. 
Formal equality of opportunity provides the most straightforward: it requires that there is a fair 
contest between applicants – that equally qualified candidates have equal chances - a condition 
that is clearly breached by the employer’s actions. Careers are not open to talents if people of a 
certain religion are excluded. 
 We have seen the advantage of including a principle of equality of opportunity, but why 
include desert prioritarianism? The reason is that it answers the same challenges to formal 
equality of opportunity and, in turn, fair equality of opportunity, that luck egalitarianism does. 
On any plausible account of desert, individual desert levels do not decrease with poor social 
circumstance or natural talent. But advantage levels do decrease with these factors. Thus, the 
person with disadvantageous social circumstance or low natural talent will have a lower 
advantage level than their desert recommends. Desert prioritarianism treats such people as of 
high priority, as luck egalitarianism does.7 And it does so without facing the difficulties of luck 
egalitarian accounts of wrongful discrimination, such as the implication that discrimination that 
levels down is not bad. This is because prioritarianism focuses on the absolute rather than 
relative position of the worse off, and their absolute position is not improved by levelling down. 
The disadvantaged’s absolute position will be improved by (justified) policies of affirmative 
action, and other benign cases of discrimination.8 Thus, desert prioritarianism seems to account 
for many cases of discrimination in a plausible way. Its one weak point can be reinforced by 
equality of opportunity. 
 Two questions lie before us. First, which form of equality of opportunity should be 
combined with desert prioritarianism? Second, how should equality of opportunity of the chosen 
kind be combined with desert prioritarianism? I will take these in turn. 
 It may seem that luck egalitarianism offers the most suitable form of equality of 
opportunity, given its accommodation of concerns about social and natural contingencies. 
However, it could be argued that this accommodation is otiose given the role of desert 
prioritarianism in the combined account. Indeed, it could even be counterproductive given the 
problems we noted with levelling down – problems that are avoided by prioritarianism. Fair 
equality of opportunity also cannot work for our purposes: its requirements of background 
fairness are partial, favouring those with social disadvantages over those with natural 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the planning officer’s discrimination was bad or wrongful, but also unjust. And Segall’s response does not, in any 
case, look promising as a defence of a luck egalitarian account of the badness of discrimination, which is not on the 
face of it a matter of justice. For further relevant discussion that would take us too far afield see Segall 2016: ch. 6.  
6 There are additional objections to the luck egalitarian account of the badness of discrimination. For instance, 
Sophie Moreau (2010: 172) considers a case in which there are many instances of prima facie discrimination but in 
such a way that they counterbalance one another, with an equal upshot. Segall denies that there is discrimination 
here, a position I find implausible. For discussion see Knight 2013a: 53-55. 
7 A different route to a similar outcome would be to endorse responsibility-sensitive prioritarianism, which can be 
construed as a kind of luck egalitarianism (Arneson 2000). Indeed, I have done just this elsewhere (Knight 2009: ch. 
6). In the text I focus on the very closely related view of desert prioritarianism for the sake of simplicity. 
8 An example may be Arneson’s (1999b) communal workplace in which all employees are gay, which ‘being small-
scale and excluding members of a dominant majority that suffers no dearth of opportunities, does not impose 
significant costs on anyone’. 
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disadvantages, and (like luck egalitarianism’s similar but more demanding requirements) 
unnecessary given the role of desert prioritarianism.  
What we need is an account of equality of opportunity that will filter out discriminatory 
acts. Adjustment of background conditions is already taken care of by desert prioritarianism. I 
believe, therefore, that formal equality of opportunity provides the appropriate supplement to 
desert prioritarianism. 
To explain that claim, I need to explain the spheres in which the two principles are 
intended to operate. Desert prioritarianism provides an axiological account of the intrinsic 
goodness or badness of a distribution. If we were only interested in how good or bad a 
distribution was, we would need nothing in addition to desert prioritarianism. With some further 
assumptions, desert prioritarianism would also provide a full account of the justice or injustice of 
a distribution. 
When we are asking about wrongful discrimination, however, we are asking about a certain 
kind of action. (This is why a naturally occurring distribution or event might be bad, but not 
wrong.) One way of identifying wrongful action is to check whether an individual’s choices make 
a distribution as good or just as they can be in the circumstances. This explains the role of desert 
prioritarianism within my account. But this cannot be the whole account of wrongful action. A 
failure to promote desert prioritarian moral value is not a necessary condition for wrongful 
discrimination. As we have seen, someone may do everything they can to promote desert 
prioritarian moral value, but still wrongfully discriminate. In other words, a good or just distribution 
may have been arrived at in a wrongful way. This is where formal equality of opportunity comes in.  
I now move on to our second question of how desert prioritarianism and formal equality 
of opportunity should be combined. I suggest the following ‘hybrid account’:  
 
First principle: maximize desert prioritarian moral value. 
Second principle: satisfy formal equality of opportunity. 
Wrongful discrimination is discrimination that fails to satisfy the first principle in any circumstance, or 
fails to satisfy both principles where both can be satisfied. 
 
The hybrid view grants lexical priority to desert prioritarianism, as it says it must always 
be satisfied, whereas formal equality of opportunity must only be satisfied where this is 
compatible with desert prioritarianism. One motivation for this priority is to accommodate 
affirmative action. Some affirmative action will satisfy desert prioritarianism, but no affirmative 
action will satisfy formal equality of opportunity. For reasons already mentioned, some 
affirmative action, at least, is not wrongful. The hybrid view reflects this by allowing that 
violations of formal equality of opportunity are not wrongful provided they are necessary to 
satisfy desert prioritarianism, as I believe is true of some affirmative action. 
To further illustrate the hybrid view, consider the case that created difficulties for desert 
prioritarianism, in which a discriminatory hire on the basis of religion, which was irrelevant to 
job performance, was perfectly consistent with desert prioritarianism. The first principle is 
satisfied, but the second principle is not satisfied, as a fair contest has not been provided - 
equally qualified candidates were not given equal chances of acquiring the job. As both principles 
could have been satisfied, but were not, this is a case of wrongful discrimination.9 Had the 
                                                          
9 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen and Hugh Lazenby suggested to me that friendships or romantic relationships may be 
more problematic for the hybrid view. Here equality of opportunity and/or desert prioritarianism seem to identify 
some ordinary and seemingly permissible conduct (e.g. choosing one person as a friend rather than another more 
disadvantaged person) as wrongful discrimination. There are at least three possible responses. First, I could 
distinguish public from private acts, and apply the hybrid account only to relevantly public acts. Second, I could bite 
the bullet, and accept that much prima facie permissible private conduct is in fact wrongful. Finally, I could argue 
that though the hybrid account applies to private acts, this does not generally have counterintuitive implications 
after all. The last of these responses is the most promising, I believe. It seems particularly important that the ‘goods’ 
of private acts, such as friendship, would often cease to be goods at all were they given only in order to satisfy moral 
9 
 
employer flipped a coin, this would not have been a case of wrongful discrimination, as equally 
qualified candidates would then have been given an equal chance and a fair contest would have 
been provided.10 
While a full defence of the hybrid account is not possible here, I hope to have said 
enough to offer some motivation for it. In short, it aims to capture considerations of both 
distribution, which explain why discrimination that disadvantages unfairly disadvantaged groups 
is wrongful, and procedure, which explain why some discrimination that is distributively fair is 
nevertheless wrongful. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter first explored disrespect, prejudice, and harm-based accounts of wrongful 
discrimination, finding that each failed to identify some cases of wrongful discrimination. Three 
accounts of equality of opportunity – formal equality of opportunity, fair equality of opportunity, 
and luck egalitarian equality of opportunity – were then considered, and it was found that these 
too were subject to counterexamples. It was, finally, argued that an account combining desert 
prioritarianism and formal equality of opportunity provided a plausible account of wrongful 
discrimination. 
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